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Abstract 
 
The crises of the 1930s and of 2008 are clear evidence of the fragility of 
the Fractional Reserve Banking System. Both of these events resulted in 
a liquidity crisis that sent the afflicted economies spiralling into deep 
recession. Security measures and regulations have been enacted to 
hinder the contagious effects of a systemic run. Unfortunately these 
have proven to be inadequate.  
 Prominent economists have wrestled with possible solutions in order to 
obtain long-term stability. We hereby present a mere few of these 
theories; Ones that we think are plausible and should be taken into 
serious consideration by the controlling powers of society. 
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I. Introduction 
The two most severe financial shocks in the western world within the 
past 100 years are undoubtedly the Great Depression of the 1930s and 
the Crisis of 2008. Both of these showed key-characteristics of what is 
called a bank-run. In short, a run is when the demand for the holding of 
liquid assets (cash, or the equivalent to cash) greatly increases. This 
leads to a shortage in supply that eventually leads to real economic 
declines. The runs occur when financial intermediaries issue debt-
contracts that features seniority-claim and promises payment at its 
face value. These two characteristics ensure that the belief of a run 
may well lead to a run, because when one investor withdraws, the 
incentive for the next investor to do the same increases. The reason for 
this being that the bank only holds a fraction of its liabilities as liquid 
reserves. A hard strain where many large investors were to claim their 
deposits in a very short amount of time would lead to an inability for 
the banks to honor their contracts (every withdrawal actually puts the 
bank closer to bankruptcy).  
As of August 2008, the entire banking system held about $50 billion in 
actual cash reserves while clearing trades of $2,996 trillion per day1. All 
of these trades promised, without a doubt, hard cash payment on 
demand to one party or the other. The run-prone nature of this system 
is hard to miss! 
 What about the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000? Surely that was 
also a recent financial setback of magnitude, although it did not result 
in a run. However, this is no coincidence. Shares funded the 
corporations, and a share does not have any of the run-prone 
attributes. 
 Since the 1930s the main legislative and regulatory focus has been on 
guarantees regarding the liabilities-side of the banks’ balance sheet 
(often constituted ex post facto, e.g. TARP2 and Deposits Insurance). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  According	  to	  Lucas	  and	  Stokey	  (2011)	  2	  The	  Troubled	  Asset	  Relief	  Program,	  allowed	  the	  US-­‐government	  to	  purchase	  up	  to	  $700	  billion	  worth	  of	  troubled	  assets	  from	  financial	  institutions	  in	  order	  to	  warrant	  financial	  stability	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The result of this is an implicit insurance for the financial institutions to 
take on more risk (moral hazard), thus a contra productive pattern that 
is maiming the system in the long run.  
 The solutions lies within reducing run-prone funding and instead fund 
debt with assets. Holding large cash reserves are no longer necessary. 
With today’s technology of instant communications, equity-financed 
banks can access liquid assets within the hour.  
 The problem lies within the nature of instability associated with the 
fractional reserve banking system (FRBS). It therefore needs to be 
evaluated in order to remove all (or at least as many as possible) of the 
run-prone securities that make up for a substantial part of it. Would the 
alternative of mandatory 100% cash reserves against demand deposits 
be a practical and desired solution or is there any other, better 
alternative, to our current system?     
II. The Framework: Reviews & Solutions 
This paper is built upon a literature study and a critical review, 
evaluating five different, possible solutions to the shortcomings of the 
current, instable banking system. We start by reviewing a stricter form of 
the current system as proposed by Stokey and Lucas (2011) followed 
by the Chicago plan of Full Reserve Banking (Benes and Kumhof 2012) 
and a form of narrow banking proposed by Cochrane (2014). The 
proposal suggested by the positive money organization (Dyson et al 
2014) and the joint-liability arrangement (Sanches 2013) is also 
reviewed. We evaluate the theories presented in search of a solution to 
reduce the probability of future bank runs. Meanwhile we weigh the 
societal costs of a possible bank run against the efficiency of keeping 
the fractional reserve banking system.  
 To get a background of the omnipresent financial challenges we 
mention two of the biggest economic crises that have occurred within 
the past 100 years. Concluding that both crises involved bank runs. The 
fact that the crisis of 2007-2008 originated within the shadow-banking 
sector is of importance because of their specific features. 
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 We then show the necessity of banks by the use of a simple general 
equilibrium model, based on the famous Arrow-Debreu Model, 
although modified by Freixas and Rochet (2008). The model shows that 
banks are redundant if market conditions were perfect. To draw a 
parallel we discuss how intermediation works in today’s society. We 
discuss the importance of having financial intermediation to make the 
economy run smoothly and to make up for market imperfections.  
We will do a further comparison of different systems using models 
presented by Freixas and Rochet (2008) to illustrate the efficiency levels 
of capital allocation that banks will be able to obtain in different 
banking systems. To understand why reforms or regulations are needed 
to our current system, it is important to first comprehend how the 
current banking system works as well as its flaws. Initially we explain the 
key features of a fractional reserve banking system and later discuss its 
inherent instabilities. 
a. The Five Ideas 
The ideas presented by Lucas and Stokey (2011) are alterations of the 
current system. They claim that the key to reduce the risk of bank runs is 
in the hands of the central bank (Federal Reserve). The central bank 
should have a clear and credible policy, and should act as a lender of 
last resort when a liquidity crisis erupts to add liquidity into the system for 
the preservation of market liquidity (i.e. not as a savior of particular 
institutions).   
 The first real reform presented is the Chicago Plan. Economists from 
Chicago initially formed the Chicago Plan in the 1930s, after the great 
depression as a suggestion of a banking reform. Famous economists 
such as Frank H. Knight, Lloyd W. Mints, Henry Schultz, Henry C. Simons, 
Garfield V. Cox, Paul H. Douglas and Albert G. Hart supported the plan. 
Irving Fisher further supported the Chicago plan and he later 
summarized it in his work 100% Money and Public Debt from 1936, but it 
was not until 2012 that Kumhof and Benes formed a more modern 
version of the Chicago Plan, showing that with the technology we 
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have today an implementation of the Chicago Plan would benefit and 
stabilize the global economy.  
 It is also essential to review milder versions of system-reforms. Cochrane 
(2014) claims that a remedy to the risky conduct of bank managers 
might be to institute a Pigouvian Tax on run-prone short-term debt. The 
tax would work like a sorter for “Financial-Darwinism” where, if the 
liabilities are economically sound, would continue to exist. Otherwise 
the tax would exterminate them and so equally, the risk they impose. 
The main goal is to prevent runs, thus identify the features of a run.  
 Ben Dyson and several other economists from the Positive Money 
Organization propose a complete reform of the current banking 
system. The proposal´s main goal is to create a stable society by 
eliminating bank runs and reducing the level of private debt. The 
benefits of this proposition are the ability to reach a sustainable 
economy and to lower the national debt in the long run. 
An alternative to narrow banking and full-reserve banking is the Joint-
Liability Arrangement between banks. This system is built upon the 
fractional reserve banking system although it offers a solution to the 
risks of bank insolvency. The principles are based on a system where 
banks voluntarily decide to become members of a coalition where 
liabilities are issued that are jointly obligated towards its members, the 
coalition would be supervised by a Clearinghouse. 
III. Background 
a. The great depression 
Between 1929-1933 the financial crisis known as The Great Depression 
hit the USA. It was a bank run where the banks´ customers lost 
confidence in the bank deposits and wanted to change deposits into 
currency. It was publicly known that the banks could only redeem a 
fraction of their customers notes which literarily made people run to get 
hands on their money first.  
 A key characteristic of a run is; If one investor pulls out, the firm is closer 
to bankruptcy, giving the second investor greater incentive to pull out 
(Cochrane, 2014). Thus the currency-deposits ratio rose dramatically 
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and the banks faced a scarcity of the medium of redemption, which 
was central bank money (Singh 2012). Even a flight of quality (where 
customers takes its deposits from a less-reputed bank to a more-
reputed bank) was a dead-end since there was a general shortage of 
currency in the whole economy. This led to a decrease in the money 
multiplier, leading to a fall in the quantity of money by well over one-
third, which turned to deflation as well as a fall in price-levels by over 
one-third in the course of four years (Freidman and Schwartz, p.299-
301, 1963) The shortage on currency came as a result of people 
hoarding cash, a typical behavior in times of recession. Consequently 
aggregated demand falls and so the possibility to cover transactions. 
Another consequence was that the shortage on the medium for 
transactions and cash was that currency was traded at a premium, 
which put the economic situation further off-balance. 
 Singh further discusses that remnants of The Gold Standard lingered 
and the commercial banks did not receive any line of credit (LOC) 
from the central banks. It is argued that the refusal to issue currency by 
the central banks further deepened the level of the crisis. In short, the 
gold under the gold standard had two uses. One was its monetary use 
(as in backing of currency value) and the second being its non-
monetary purpose (in jewelry, industry etc.) Any switch between the 
two changed the amount of monetary gold, which in turn affected the 
prices.  By this there is two types of base money under the gold 
standard, gold and currency as opposed to the current system of fiat 
money where there is only one form of base money. Since there is a 
natural scarcity of gold, any increase in demand for monetary gold 
resulted in fluctuations in price levels (societally costly). During the great 
depression there was no deposit insurance nor did the central bank 
intervene by open market operations in order to stabilize the economy. 
The then contemporary rigid central banks might have considered it 
too risky to offer credits to the commercial banks or they may have 
been hindered by old ideas. 
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b. The crisis of 2007-2008 
The first thing that marks this recent crisis as different from earlier ones is 
that it was a panic on wholesale funds, not a panic on retail funds. 
Here financial firms (amongst others) ran on other financial firms, which 
forced massive deleveraging, resulting in an insolvent banking system. 
The commercial banks were not at the roots of the problem in this 
latest crisis, it erupted in the Shadow-Banking sector. The shadow banks 
(SB) worked on the same principles as the fractional reserve system and 
held almost no liquid reserves. They worked as a parallel system, 
outside the regulations of the ordinary banking-system. Cochrane 
(2014) describes how the giant financial firms Bear Sterns and Lehman 
Brothers were leveraged 30:1 on their overnight mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) that they used as collateral for financing portfolios. This 
means that for every $30 of investment, they had to borrow, anew, $29 
to pay back yesterdays debt. Thus the Shadow Banks backed their 
borrowing on asset-backed securities (ABS)3 that were collateralized by 
unsecure, run-prone, underlying assets; Hence the similarities to FRBS. 
The actual run started when large firms and investors refused to renew 
their repos4. 
A dangerous characteristic of a panic is when bank debt is not longer 
considered informationally insensitive. This alters the preferences of 
agents whom now prefer cash, which is truly insensitive from private 
information; By this, the logic behind the deposit insurance holds, 
where private information about the bank does not substantiate a low 
risk preference (Gorton 2009). Information-asymmetries led to 
speculations regarding the collateral that backed the assets of the 
shadow banks, e.g. bonds made up by defaulted, securitized loans. A 
principle of “first come, first served” emerged and firms ran to withdraw 
their funds. In order to prevent another crisis of the sort of 2008 a 
regulatory system called Basel III was formed. It is a directing framework 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A	  Security	  whose	  value	  is	  base	  on	  a	  pool	  of	  underlying	  assets	  4	  Repo:	  Repurchase	  Agreement	  –	  The	  sale	  of	  a	  security	  with	  the	  contracted	  agreement	  of	  repurchase	  (by	  the	  seller)	  at	  a	  higher	  price	  on	  a	  later	  date.	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on the use of capital, risk and stress testing for banks. The system is 
designed to work along side the previous accords of Basel I and  
Basel II.  
 
IV. Financial Intermediation 
a. Intermediation under Perfect Markets 
To examine why banks are needed in the first place we use a simple 
general equilibrium model that is presented by Freixas and Rochet 
(2008) based on the famous Arrow-Debreu Model. This model includes 
the banking sector. Figure 1.1 shows the financial decision of the 
economic agents. The model is simplified and assumes perfect market 
conditions with profit maximization. To simplify the model further it does 
not include the government or the central bank, nor does it account 
for transaction costs.  
 
Figure 1.1, Financial decisions by economic agents 
 
The model is a two-dates model (t = 1, 2), with a physical good owned 
by the consumers and used as a tool of measurement. The model 
consists of 3 representative agents: firms, consumers and a bank. We 
use subscriptions to distinguish the consumer (h), firm (f) and the bank 
(b). The physical good will be partially consumed at t = 1 and the rest 
will be invested by the firms to produce consumption at t = 2. All agents 
will act competitively. 
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The consumer receives ω1 as endowment in the first period for 
consumption (C1) and allocates the remaining resources between 
bonds issued by the bank or the firm (Bh) and bank deposits (Dh), to 
maximize the utility under the budget constraint. p denotes the price of 
C2, the consumption level in the second period which depends on the 
profits of the firm (Πf) respectively the bank (Πb) and the return from the 
bonds and the bank deposits, where r and rD are interest rates paid on 
bonds and bank deposits. The obvious solution is as in (1.3) due to 
oversimplification of the model where bonds and bank deposits are 
perfect substitutes. The interest rate will be equal. 
Ph - max u(C1, C2) 
C1 + Bh + Dh = ω1, (1.1) 
pC2  = Πf + Πb + (1 + r)Bh + (1 + rD)Dh   (1.2) 
r = rD (1.3) 
The firm finances its investment by issuing bonds (Bf) and by taking 
loans (Lf) from the bank in order to maximize its profit. The profit 
depends on how well the invested money is spent, where (f) is a 
production function. r and rL is interest rate that the firm will pay to the 
bondholders and to the bank. Because bank loans and bonds are 
perfect substitutes, the solution will be as in (1.6). 
Pf – max Πf 
Πf = pf(I) – (1 + r)Bf – (1 + rL)Lf  (1.4) 
I = Bf + Lf (1.5) 
r = rL (1.6) 
The bank gives loans to firms (Lb) that are financed from issuing bonds 
(Bb) and deposits from the consumers (Db). Banks try to maximize their 
profit by issuing the right amount of bonds and get the right amount of 
deposits. The solution for the bank will be as (1.9). 
Pb - max Πb 
Πb = rLLb – rBb – rDDb (1.7) 
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Lb = Bb + Db (1.8) 
r = rL = rD (1.9) 
In general equilibrium all three agents need to behave optimally and 
solve their maximization problem. Where in the good market 
investments will equal savings (I = S), deposit market (Db = Dh), credit 
market (Lf = Lb) and bond market (Bh = Bf + Bb) all clears. If we combine 
the solutions for the consumer and the firm (1.3) and (1.6) it is clear that 
the only solution will be as (1.9), where all interest rate will be equal. 
Banks profit is shown in (1.7) and will be zero because all the interest 
rates will be the same and bonds and deposits are perfect substitutes 
meaning that the assets of the bank will be canceled out by the 
liabilities. If the bank is non-profitable and the consumer sees bonds as 
perfect substitute to depositing the money, as well as the firms sees 
that issuing bonds as perfect substitute as taking bank loans, banks 
would not be needed in our simplified example. But in reality, the 
markets are not perfect and this model is too incomplete and 
oversimplified to be able to reflect the reality. The market is not perfect 
where informational asymmetries exist (thus imperfect market 
conditions), a financial institute, such as a bank can mitigate this 
imperfection. 
b. Financial Intermediation Under the Current System 
The classic definition of a bank’s intermediary service is that of an 
economic agent who specializes in the activities of buying and selling 
(at the same time) financial claims (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). The 
service provided greases economic development by the reallocation 
of capital and make up for market imperfections. Just as Schumpeter 
(1934) put it in his classic theories the scenario might be a researcher or 
entrepreneur who have a great idea but are lacking the funds needed 
to fulfill it. Schumpeter derives development from innovations and 
entrepreneurs. Innovations may consist of the introduction or 
improvement of a new product or a new production process, the 
opening up of a new market, the mining of new raw materials etc. For 
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these processes to be successful it is crucial that the innovator has 
access to credit lines. 
At the same time as the entrepreneur needs funds there might be 
someone with a surplus of funds. The bank will buy this surplus at an 
interest rate (in the form of a deposits account) and then sell the funds 
as a loan to the researcher or entrepreneur by a higher interest rate. By 
such a setup indirect financing have been successfully obtained. (Note 
that the interest rates for deposits today are close to none; thus 
theoretical justifications of the existence of the intermediary service 
based on this assumption fails). 
As opposed to this there might also be a situation of direct financing. 
Then the part that is lacking funds will e.g. issue stocks and the part with 
a surplus will invest directly into the company in the exchange for a 
percentage of ownership. 
The rationale behind indirect financing may be seen from three 
perspectives. Convenience Denomination makes it possible for the 
bank to cover a large indivisible loan from a large investor by 
collecting deposits from many small depositors (or vice versa). By 
Quality Transformation the bank may have better insight in a certain 
investment than a single investor, thus covering for information 
asymmetries. The bank may also have better possibilities to diversify all 
of its invested funds than that of a single investor, consequently 
converting risky investment into less risky. The third and final is maturity 
transformation (the general system under Fractional Reserve Banking) 
where the bank borrows money at a shorter term than they lend out 
money. 
The market imperfections can be, inter alia, translated into information 
asymmetries that could be further derived to specific transaction costs. 
As argued by Freixas and Rochet (2008) the classic forms of transaction 
costs are given endogenously whereby physical and technological 
costs usually are included. Since the emergence of more 
telecommunication- and computer-driven financial markets and with 
the development of more sophisticated financial instruments the need 
for the financial institutions (FI) persist. The three most crucial forms of 
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information asymmetries tackled by the FIs (and by what time they are 
addressed by the intermediation) are adverse selection (ex ante), 
moral hazard (interim) and costly state verification (ex post). 
Adverse selection for banks is e.g. a problem faced when borrowers of 
a loan-agreement have more information about its own situation than 
the lenders. It is argued that the ones that have the least ability to 
repay their loans are the ones most likely to get a loan. This is based on 
assumption that the clientele that are most actively looking for the 
opportunity to get a loan are also the ones accepting it on (almost) 
any terms. Alas the loan will be “bad” as it is unfavorably affected by 
the events of the selection before the issuance. When the loan is finally 
in place the risk of moral hazard arises.  If the borrower lacks real 
incentives to repay the loan and feels that it is not “their money”, there 
is a higher probability of engaging in a risky and morally hazardous 
conduct. Outside this agreement, as a collateral for the lender, one 
can construct the contract for the loan in such a way that it lies in the 
borrowers interest to display truthfully about his performance regarding 
the usage of the loan. The costs associated with this “extended” 
monitoring falls on the lender.  The scenario can be realized by 
conditional repayment structure where an audit process is in place. 
The information disclosed in the audit may then result in a penalty (or 
reward) specified between the lender and the borrower. 
 
V. Basic Principles of Fractional Reserve Banking 
 
A large part of the banks´ activities revolves around lending and 
borrowing. The former makes up a big part of the assets side of the 
banks balance sheet. Lending are commonly long-term credits that 
would be financed by short-term borrowing, foremost by demand 
deposits that are making up for a large post on the liabilities side. These 
are short-term in the sense that they may be withdrawn at anytime. It is 
unlikely that all deposits would be withdrawn at the same time. 
Accordingly, current deposits held by the bank cover all “day-to-day” 
transactions within themselves. 
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Figure 1.2.  Bank Balance Sheet 
 
Figure 1.2 shows a rough sketch (not according to scale) of the 
proportions of the biggest posts on the banks balance sheet. 
The characteristics of demand deposits are: (1) demand deposits have 
no fixed maturity; they can be exchanged for cash at par on demand;  
(2) they are senior claims; (3) they are claims on a portfolio; (4) they 
can be used in transactions. This form of debt is created by depository 
institutions and by money market mutual funds that offer checking. 
(Gorton 2009) These are covered, in the regulated banking sector, by 
deposits insurance. 
The more unusual large deposits and uncommonly hard strains on the 
short-term liabilities are covered by the banks´ reserves. The fractional-
reserve banking system is built on the principles that only a fraction of 
the liabilities of the banks balance needs to be covered by its reserves. 
This rests on the assumption mentioned above, that not all deposits 
would be withdrawn at any one time. Herein lies the inherent instability 
(elaborated further on) of the fractional-reserve banking system. During 
normal market behavior the financial circulation behaves as 
anticipated. The bank reserves, interbank lending or small adjustments 
from the central bank may cover small volatilities, albeit systemic 
shocks immediately puts the structure off-balance. 
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The need for financial intermediaries (please read the section 
Intermediation under Perfect Markets) would not exist if real markets 
were to function perfectly. 
a. The Inherent Instability Under The FRBS 
In the banks balance sheet, a major part of the liabilities is made up by 
short-term debt. 
On the assets side the major part consists of assets written on longer 
terms. This practice is known as Maturity Transformation, i.e. a system 
where borrowing is made on a shorter timeframe than that of the 
lending. The longer-term resources are more prone to fluctuations, 
which means higher volatility of the banks’ net worth (its assets minus its 
liabilities). Common long-term assets would be e.g. company- or 
private loans, both generally illiquid. This means that they cannot back-
up for any sudden large withdrawals from the deposits accounts.  
On the one side are the illiquid assets and on the other side are 
liabilities that can be acquired on instant demand. Hereby a problem 
may arise because of the mismatching nature when the banks liabilities 
are more liquid than its assets. The banks are thereby vulnerable to 
crises since they are subordinate to the confidence of its holder (or 
even the general market). The bank would fail to meet the demand of 
all depositors if they all should choose to withdraw at a short period of 
time. Banks are thus vulnerable to self-fulfilling panics in which 
depositors withdraw their funds simply because they believe other 
depositors will do so (Chari and Phelan 2012).  By this, the self-fulfilling 
nature of a crisis leading to a bank run is that “the belief of a run, leads 
to a run” because the rational thing to do for all depositors is to 
withdraw their funds as soon as possible before others can do so. This 
holds since the common knowledge that banks cannot cover all 
deposits in case of a mass-withdrawal, consequently the rationale of 
“the earlier one retrieves ones funds, the higher is the chance of 
success in doing so” applies. 
The government has strong incentives to bail out debt holders if a 
panic is due to occur. Because of the toxic nature of negative financial 
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shocks if such an incident were to be neglected it may well lead to a 
systemic bank run. The paradox is that parties involved will have 
incentives for higher preferences of risk. As put by Chari and Phelan 
(2012), Bank managers have increased incentives to take on risk, 
knowing that their failures are implicitly insured. The taxpayers would be 
the ones to bear the consequence of a crash. Furthermore, the 
depositors are less motivated to monitor the bank managers since their 
accounts are covered. This postpones action, leading to a deeper 
crisis if a systemic failure would befall.  
Lucas and Stokey (2011) lists some points that should be taken as 
lessons from the panic of 2008. (1) Regulating banks may reduce the 
likelihood of a liquidity crisis although it cannot entirely eliminate it. The 
Dodd-Frank Act 5  suggests that the Federal Reserve (Fed) should 
predict and prevent future crises, a task that is impossible to follow. (2) 
The Fed should act as a lender of last resort during liquidity crisis. If 
beneficial, the Fed should help by adding liquidity to the system to 
ease economic decline. (3) The message from the Fed should be clear 
and well understood regarding its policy for liquidity crises. During 2008 
the general opinion were under the impression that the Fed would 
ensure the life of the too-big-to-fail firms and the decision to not save 
Lehman Brothers came as a shock. If the actual policies of the Fed are 
well communicated the risk for unfavorable beliefs is severely 
mitigated.  
(4) Deposit insurance is a partial solution. Initially it was seen as a 
consumer protection rather than a run-prevention-mechanism. It did 
prevent runs on commercial banks during 2008 although the 
regulations on how to back deposits with assets need to be redefined.  
(5) Deposit insurance has only a limited role. Many of today´s financial 
institutions stand outside the protection (and regulation) of the insured 
system and the crisis of 2008 involved a considerable part of these. 
Although the markets outside the insured system offer higher returns 
and will therefore always be an attractive playground. (6) The Fed’s 
goal should be to maintain market liquidity, not in the preservation of 	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particular institutions. The focus should be (and by such understood by 
all) to have a credible policy on liquidity injections in the economy 
during crises and to not distort the incentives of the banks. The 
definition on what terms the Fed will lend on and in what situations 
need to be very clear. They should also carefully describe on what 
indicators they will portray as a crisis and when action will be sparked. 
And more importantly, what type of collateral will be accepted when 
covering a distressed bank’s deposits.  
VI. Proof of FRBS Efficiency 
The following model is presented to grant a better understanding of 
the efficiency of capital allocation between different banking systems.   
The model is a three-dates model (t = 0, 1, 2) with a good that is 
endowed to agents who are ex ante identical, which means that they 
all are identical in period 0. This good can be consumed at date t = 1 
or t = 2. C1, C2 denotes when the good is consumed. The consumers will 
either consume the good early t =1, or consume it late t =2. We will 
distinguish these types of consumers as impatient consumer 
(consuming at t= 1) and patient consumer (consume at t = 2). This is a 
simple way to illustrate whether the consumer is facing liquidity  
shock and have to consume the good early. π1 is the probability of 
consuming early and π2 is the probability of consuming  
it late. π1 + π2 = 1. 
The good can be stored from one period to the next period or be 
invested in a long term technology (I) at t = 0 and the invested amount 
gives R > 1 in return at t = 2, if the consumer do not consume the good 
before, but if the consumer need to consume the good at t = 1, the 
invested amount needs to be liquidated at a value of (Z < 1). 
So the utility will either be u(C1) or u(C2). In t = 0 the expected utility of a 
depositor will be as follow: 
U = π1 u(C1 ) + π2 u(C2 ) (2.1) 
We start by examine a model where agents cannot trade with each 
other (no financial market). 
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Agents cannot trade so when they face a liquidity shock they need to 
liquidate their investment. The consumption level will be: 
C1 = ZI + 1 - I (2.2) 
And if the agent does not need to liquidate the investment, the 
consumption level will be: 
C2 = RI + 1 - I (2.3) 
It is obvious that C1 ≤ 1 and C2 ≤ R due to the fact that Z < 1 and R > 1. 
So the best-case scenario if the agent must liquidate at t = 1 is if the 
invested amount is I = 0 and if the agent can evade the liquidation the 
best outcome is to have the full amount invested (I = 1). The main 
problem here is that the decision will always be inefficient due to the 
fact that the agents do not know if they will face a liquidity shock  
at t = 1. 
π1C1 + π2C2/R < 1 (2.4) 
2.4 shows that efficiency is not reached and this problem can be 
mitigated by opening a financial market.        
In this financial market (bond market) p units of good is exchanged  
at t = 1 promising one unit of good at t = 2. The consumption level for 
the dates will be:  
C1 = pRI + 1 - I (2.5) 
C2 = RI + 1 - I/p (2.6) 
In 2.5 the impatient agent has sold RI bonds instead of liquidating the 
invested amount and in 2.6, the patient agent has bought ((I - 1) /p) 
bonds instead of storing the money. If pR > 1 it is more efficient to invest 
more, I = 1, while pR < 1 the most efficient decision will be to invest less, 
I = 0. 
Observe that C1 = pC2 and the investment decision is at t = 0, the only 
solution will be pR = 1. Giving the price of bonds to p = 1/R.  
The allocation will be C1 = 1, C2 = R, which dominates the model where 
no financial market is available. Giving the answer that a financial 
market contributes positively in the aspect of efficient investment 
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decision. Welfare increases when agents are allowed to trade, thus 
showing that this model pareto-dominates (all situations improves for all 
parties involved) the previous model where no financial market exists. 
Notice that the optimal I will be, I = π2  
A market including a financial market still does not achieve pareto-
optimal allocation, which is the most efficient allocation of resources. 
This is achieved by maximizing (2.1) under the constraints of:  
π1C1  = 1 - I and π2C2 = RI 
P1 max π1 u(C1 ) + π2 u(C2 ) (2.7) 
By eliminating I we can make it to a single constraint by substituting: 
I = π2C2 /R ---> π1C1 + π2C2 /R = 1 (2.8) 
Leading to the optimal allocation that satisfies the first-order condition. 
u´(𝐶!∗) = Ru´(𝐶!∗) ---> u´(𝐶!∗)/u´(𝐶!∗)= R 
This expresses that when optimal allocation is achieved, the quota of 
the marginal utility of consumption in t = 1 and t = 2, will equal the 
return of the long-term technology. 
As seen above no financial market is included in this model. 
This pareto-optimal state can be achieved by implementing a financial 
intermediary who offers deposit contracts. The agents will deposit at  
t = 0 and will be able to get 𝐶!∗ at t =1 or 𝐶!∗ at t = 2. This FI (Bank) will 
only be able to pay back the promised amount if they invest I = 1 - π1𝐶!∗ 
in a long-term technology. These will consist of loans given to 
individuals and will be illiquid. The π1𝐶!∗ will be the amount that in this 
case, the bank will have as reserve to be able to hand out the 
promised amount to the agents who face a liquidity shock and will 
withdraw that specific amount from the bank. This bank will have the 
features of a fractional reserve bank.  
 We have now established that a bank under a fractional reserve 
banking system will be able to offer optimal deposit contracts, 
however the main question here is if this system is safe. Do the patient 
consumers remain patient in every scenario? Consumers will be 
maximizing their utility and thus will not withdraw early because 𝐶!∗< 𝐶!∗ if 
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the consumers believe that the bank will be able to fulfill their 
obligations at t = 2.  
In this case the sole withdrawers will be those who face a liquidity shock 
and will be equal to the reserve amount of the bank, which is  
π1 𝐶!∗ . In this case the bank will run smoothly and no premature 
liquidation of long-term technology is needed. Another equilibrium 
might be taken into consideration, using game theory. The Nash 
Equilibrium where the "players" need to consider how the other 
"players" will act. In this case the consumers need to consider how the 
other consumers think. If the patient consumer believes that other 
patient consumers will withdraw early, the patient consumer will 
withdraw early, leading to a mass withdrawal exceeding π1𝐶!∗. All assets 
of the bank needs to be liquidated at a value of π1𝐶!∗+ Z(1-π1𝐶!∗ ) < 1. 
Considering this the patient consumer will withdraw early because 
nothing will be left at t = 2. This is called an inefficient bank run, 
however, it can be severely mitigated by implementing deposit 
insurance thus securing the invested amount for the patient consumer, 
giving them less of an incentive to withdraw early. 
Now when we have confirmed the fact that a bank under a fractional 
reserve banking system can achieve optimal allocation of resources. 
However, it is important to find alternatives because of the inherent 
instability of the FRBS. The origin of the instability is due to the paradox 
of two Nash equilibria, where one is inefficient.  
The alternative would be to have a 100% backing of deposits. This 
proposal is called full-reserve banking and we will show that this form is 
not desirable because of its nature of inefficiency. The mildest version 
of this narrow bank will be the most interesting version, when 
comparing to the fractional reserve banking system. We start off by 
making a short presentation of the most strict form of narrow banking, 
which is a 100% backing of deposits. 
P2 max π1 u(C1) + π2 u(C2 ) (2.9) 
C1 ≤ 1 - I and C2 ≤ RI 
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By looking at the constraint it is clear that the solution will be 
dominated by P1. In fact it will be dominated by a system where no 
banks exists and agents are not able to trade with each other, which is 
shown in (2.4). In a milder version, banks will be able to liquidate their 
long-term investments so depositors can withdraw at t = 1. In reality 
loans cannot be liquidated due to the fact that they are illiquid. In this 
case the loans will be sold to another institute yielding (Z < 1). The utility 
will be the same as in (2.4), where no financial market exists. 
The next step would be to analyze a weaker form of a narrow bank, 
this bank will be able to reinvest their deposits in long term riskless 
financial assets instead of making loans; this type of bank will function 
as a money market fund. This Bank will be more efficient than the 
previous ones and be as efficient as if a financial market is opened, as 
discussed earlier in this paper. Still being less efficient than a fractional 
reserve banking system that achieves pareto-optimal allocation. 
Nevertheless, it is efficient enough to consider a narrow bank that acts 
in the same fashion as a money market fund, to be a somewhat 
desirable solution to a the fractional reserve banking system. Bank runs 
will not occur if the bank is a narrow bank, so in the end, the question is 
if this increase in stability is worth the decrease in efficiency. Thus 
mitigating the societal costs associated with bank runs. 
VII. About Shadow Banking 
The definitions of Shadow Banking (SB) Activities have differed widely. 
Especially after the latest financial shock (2007-2008) and with the 
common acceptance that this indeed erupted within the Shadow 
Banking Sector it becomes important to have an unambiguous 
description on the shadow banks. A good point of departure would be 
in the description stated by the US Financial Stability Board (2012): 
“Credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully or partially) 
outside the regular banking system.” 
                                                                                FSB (2012) 
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Although this definition excludes important details it does set a 
reasonable framework. Entities operating in the financial market that 
need to be added to the category of SBs is credit-oriented hedge 
funds, leasing and financing companies corporate tax vehicles and 
short repos (often written on a one day maturity) etc. Also practices 
operated by banks include that of the shadow banking activity. 
Examples are Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV), Liquidity Puts on 
securitizations etc. These activities of intermediation can be derived 
from an actual demand where the possibilities of regulatory arbitrage 
exist and where the normal supervision attached to commercial banks 
fail; Hence the ever altering nature of SB, making juridical classification 
difficult. By this it is crucial to foresee where the shadow banks will 
operate in the future. An attempt to summarize the characteristics of 
an SB has been made by Claessens and Ratnovski (2014) in their IMF 
Working Paper. The model by Claessens and Ratnovski (2014) (figure 
1.3) gives a good illustration on the classifications that distinguishes a 
traditional bank and a traditional intermediation entity towards a 
shadow bank. The SB needs a Backstop to operate which might be 
explained as a last-resort support security. If e.g. an investment would 
fail to reach its full pledge, the provider of a backstop would purchase 
the remainder of the amount. By the definition on shadow banking 
mentioned above one would cover the eventual services undertaken 
by a shadow banking entity in the future as well as in the current 
manner of operations and by emphasizing on the usage of backstops 
which is the fundament of risk-coverage for alternative banking. Since 
the margins of a shadow bank are too low to be self-supportive of a 
backstop it needs external access to capital to cover for its risk 
absorption (read further on the topic in the article by Claessens and 
Ratnovski  (2014)). Here a parallel arises to the commercial banks, 
demand deposits in the sense that deposits are usually short term (one 
day repos) and may be withdrawn at maturity. The SB can use the 
deposits for further investments (rehypothecation) (in the same way a 
commercial bank uses demand deposits as liquid currency).  
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“Traditional ” 
intermediation by 
institutions 
Activities commonly referred 
to as forms of “shadow 
banking” 
“Traditional ” 
intermediation by 
market entities 
Traditional banking 
(deposit taking 
and lending) 
Traditional 
insurance 
Securitization, including: 
tranching of claims, maturity 
transformation, liquidity “puts” 
from banks to SIVs, support to 
par value money funds. 
Collateral services, primarily 
through dealer banks, 
including: supporting the 
efficient re-use of collateral in 
repo transactions, for OTC 
derivatives and in prime 
brokerage; securities lending. 
Bank wholesale funding 
arrangement, including the 
use of collateral in repos and 
the operations of the tri-party 
repo market 
Deposit-taking and/or lending 
by non-banks, including that 
by insurance companies (e.g., 
France) and bank-affiliated 
companies (e.g., India and 
China). 
In capital markets: 
Hedge funds 
Investment 
companies 
Underwriters 
Market-makers 
Custodians 
Brokers 
In non-bank sector: 
Leasing and 
finance companies 
Corporate tax 
vehicles 
Figure 1.3 Spectrums of Financial Activities (Claessens and Ratnovski 
(2014)) 
The authors conclude to the definition of shadow banking in the 
following manner: 
“All financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a 
private or public backstop to operate.” 
                                                                   Claessens and Ratnovski  (2014) 
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One form of securitized asset used as collateral is the technique of 
turning assets that are non-marketable into a financial instrument (as 
combining several bank loans into a bond). In this process a degree of 
diversification is obtained. Further risk control is achieved by tranching 
(dividing the bond into portions with different attributes of maturity, risk 
and returns). If a number of depositors choose to not roll over their 
repos the SB would quickly face a liquidity crisis.	  
In reference to the latest crisis the SBs overleveraged and could not 
honor their commitments and therefore became insolvent. 
Consequently there was a “wholesale-panic” where large financial 
firms negated the renewal of their sales and repos, or made an 
increase of the repo-margins (“haircut”) which forced a massive 
deleveraging, resulting in insolvency, Gorton (2009). The crisis can 
accordingly be addressed as a bank run. In such a fashion the shadow 
banking systems have similarities to the banking system before the 
introduction of deposit insurance. An important note is that in our 
current system, boom-and-bust cycles are inevitable, causing 
uncertainty to the value of collaterals when prices on assets fall (near 
bust).  
 A large part of the shadow banks’ funding originated from the selling 
of repos. The repo market is a place where mainly large institutional 
investors such as pension funds and large companies lend large 
amounts of money for a short period of time. The main reason why they 
lend at the repo market is because they want to obtain higher yields 
than normal deposit interest rates. These large companies want to 
ensure that the loan is safe by receiving collaterals with low fluctuations 
in value. This is important because if the underlying value does not 
change the loans are considered risk-free. Although the amount lent 
can still be used by the lender (on a daily basis) and thus a parallel to a 
bank can be made. Where depositing money at the bank can be 
used on demand. At first, the shadow banks used treasury credits as 
collaterals. These collaterals were completely risk-free, but due to the 
scarcity of treasury credit all repo loans could not be backed with 
treasury credit. Later, collaterals that did not consist of treasury credit 
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could consist of a pool of mortgages that were diversified and 
tranched to lower the risk-levels and later securitized. The main 
problem with this securitized pool of mortgages, which is mortgage-
backed securities (MBS), is that the value of these securities fluctuates 
depending on how the house market behaves (as in the case of 2008).  
As an example, MBS were used as collateral when taking loans. When 
the house market started to decline, investors were starting to believe 
that the default rate of any given pool of mortgages would rise. Repo 
lenders would then naturally ask for more collateral due to the 
uncertainty of the underlying value of the collateral. Eventually repo 
lenders stopped the renewal of the repos and potential borrowers with 
good MBS would not be able to renew the repo. The sudden stop of 
the renewals of the repos caused a systemic run (bank run) which 
sparked the beginning of the financial crisis (Sanches 2014). This is a 
good example showing that a run is more likely to occur if the assets 
are hard to value. Cochrane (2014) refers to an example, where “Eight 
bottles of Tylenol laced with cyanide, sold in a Chicago drugstore, 
instantly transformed 31 million bottles of Tylenol located in stores all 
over the globe into toxic assets that could find no buyers.” It is not 
worth examining every single bottle for the harmful substance and no 
one wants to be held accountable in case of a miss. In the same 
sense, it is not worth investigating every MBS, it is instead easier and 
cheaper to not renew any of the repos.  
 One of the best examples to illuminate the interconnectedness of the 
whole financial market (SBs, investment banks and ordinary 
commercial banks) is in the burst of the MBSs. The commercial banks 
issued a massive amount of lending to households, both good and 
bad, and the investment banks backed housing construction equally. 
In order “clean up” their balance sheets the banks packaged the 
loans into MBS. The MBS where then bought by a Shadow Bank, who 
uses it as collateral to show when asking for funds through repos 
(agreements with large investors and firms). By now a large part of the 
economy is intertwined with each other. When the MBSs finally went 
under the microscope it was realized that it consisted of highly 
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correlated (and some bad) loans. All of a sudden all similar securities 
were seen as contagious and the systemic panic was a fact.  
VIII. Risks And Liquidity In Banking 
“A bank is solvent so long as the total value of its assets exceeds the 
total value of its liabilities. A bank can remain solvent if it can take care 
of the risks it faces. These are of two types: diversifiable risks and non-
diversifiable risks” 
                                                                                            Singh (2012) 
The former type of risk is reduced by, as the name suggests, 
diversification. By making sure that the returns of the assets in the 
banks´ asset portfolio are not correlated would eliminate the 
probability of diversifiable risk. 
Holding capital for a bank comes with costs. Depositors are free to 
withdraw whenever they choose. This keeps the management at bay 
and serves as a stipulation for moral hazard. Another cost that would 
be associated with the depositors is that the interest rates on a deposits 
account are usually smaller than the expected returns for a 
shareholder. Thereby the cost is “income forgone”. 
A solvent bank can face liquidity problems. If depositors have the 
perception of weakness in the bank holding their deposits the rational 
thing to do would be a full withdrawal thus resulting in a bank run. In 
accordance to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) a bank with fractional 
reserves works fine under Nash Equilibrium during Pareto Efficiency.  
The Nash Equilibrium might be concluded to a state where everyone 
has full information on each other; one can anticipate the actions of 
others. Thereby ones own choices will be made in consideration to the 
rest of the market-participants. 
Furthermore, the Pareto Efficiency (a situation of optimal resource 
allocation, where any one part can not get better off without making 
the situation worse for at least one other part) for banks occurs when 
any changes to make an individual bank (institution, intermediaries 
etc.) better would put one, or more, in a worse position. 
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Conclusions of observations by Singh (2012) tell that a near-systemic 
bank run can be avoided without the intervention of the government. 
If one bank in an economy would suffer from a run, it would surely 
affect other banks in the same economy. The bank in distress could be 
offered a Pigouvian subsidy on a Line-Of-Credit (LOC) from another 
bank. I.e. the bank offering the LOC would have an excess of capital 
at this given time. By transferring this capital to the bank in distress it 
may mitigate the incentives for a run thus aiding the economy as a 
whole. Herein lies a trade-off between competition and stability.  The 
point of a near-systemic bank run is that there is a shift of deposits 
between less reputed banks towards more reputed banks. 
A Systemic bank run is a run towards the whole sector, where the 
general public wants to make a shift from deposits to currency. 
Measures can be taken by the central bank to calm these runs (e.g. by 
offering deposit insurance) or to cover the actual amount of deposits 
by offering an individual LOC towards the affected banks. The LOC 
would be of an exact match of the total amount of the deposits for 
each of the respective banks. In a near-systemic bank run the LOC 
would be between the more reputed banks and the less reputed 
banks, in which the trust of the public lies with the more reputed banks. 
In the case of a systemic bank run the trust lies in currency, thus in the 
central bank. The principles are very similar though the notation differs. 
Selling off liquid assets can also cover a bank run, although market 
activity usually falls drastically during times of a bank run, making assets 
that are liquid during normal times illiquid in times of a negative shock. 
There are some crucial differences in the central bank acting as a 
lender of last resort and in the offering a LOC to banks that face 
liquidity problems. As a lender of last resort, the central bank acts ex-
post. By such it would not have the possibility to fully monitor whether or 
not the receiver of the loan is facing liquidity- or solvency problems 
(elaborated later) hence the greater risk for moral hazard. By selling a 
LOC to a bank would be an action ex-ante. The monitoring process 
could then be more thorough thus better justifying the final verdict. A 
potential buyer of a LOC would be put under the microscope in 
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supervision of the issuing institution consequently lessening the 
probability of morally hazardous conduct. 
a. Differences between Illiquidity and Insolvency 
A bank can be solvent but still face liquidity problems. This might be 
due to the cause of a liquidity shock. In normal times (during generally 
normal market conditions) a solvent bank should not face problems 
with liquidity although if some sort of market failure is present the 
solvent bank might be in a position of illiquidity. These would be stated 
as abnormal time, or abnormal market behavior. History has shown that 
during a crisis or some kind of market shock, liquid assets might be hard 
to liquidate. Therefor a “clean” balance sheet is not enough in such a 
scenario. When facing problems with liquidity the buying of a LOC can 
be beneficial.  
 A solvency problem is when liabilities outweigh the assets of the 
balance sheet. Even if all assets were liquidated the bank would still be 
in debt. 
IX. The Chicago Plan Reviewed 
 Banks after the Chicago Plan reform will have a system where money 
will be issued by the government as debt-free money as opposed to 
the current system where money is privately-issued and debt-based. 
Thus banks deposits will be fully backed with reserves. 
Benes et al. (2012) claims, by reference to Fisher (1936), that at least 
four advantages will arise when converting to the system in 
accordance to the Chicago Plan reform; (1) Inter Alia, claims are 
made that business cycles will not fluctuate as much because, under 
the new system, banks will be pure intermediaries, banks cannot lend 
money unless they obtain funding to finance the loans. Banks would 
not be able to create money as before, ex nihilo, which will change 
the banks´ attitude towards credit risk, consequently reducing the 
banks’ ability to heavily influence the volatility of the business cycles.  
 (2) As mentioned earlier, banks deposits will be fully backed by 
reserves, meaning that bank runs will be non-existent. This will increase 
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the financial stability and banks will be able to focus on their core 
lending functions. Banks do not have to worry about instabilities 
originating from the liability side of the balance sheet, which will now 
consist of run-proof non-monetary liabilities. 
(3) The liability side off the balance sheet will consist out of a 
combination of equity and loans from the government treasury.  
A heavy reduction of [net] government debt can be a possible 
outcome. Because the government would be able to issue money at 
zero interest, instead of borrowing it from banks at an interest, this 
would lead to a lower interest burden for the government when 
financing projects and would reduce the government [net] debt. 
Banks would need to fully back their deposits. That will be achieved by 
borrowing reserves from the treasury. The government could buy back 
government bonds from the banks by cancelling out the treasury 
credit. (4) There will also be the potential of a great reduction of 
private debt, as a result of the buyback of large amounts of private 
debts from banks against cancellation of treasury credit. This is possible 
because the government will have a negative net debt position.  
 Kumhof and Benes could verify the four advantages that Irving Fisher 
claims, by careful analytical work and simulations (Not presented in this 
paper, see Benes et al. (2012)) and they further claim that the 
economy will have a large steady state output gains due to the fact 
that several distortions will be gone or reduced when converting to a 
system under the Chicago plan. The distortions would be interest rate 
risk spreads, distortionary taxes and costly monitoring of macro 
economically unnecessary credit risks.  
X. Private and Government Money Issuance 
This aspect is important to consider because private money issuance is 
associated with fractional reserve banking, while government issued 
money is associated with full-reserve banking (Narrow banking), so 
called safe banks as previously mentioned. Graeber (2011) has shown 
that private issuance of money has several times led to major societal 
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problems. This has been the case because it is often combined with 
private debts. 
According to Zarlenga (2002) private creators of money manipulate 
the money supply and choose to create more at times of economic 
expansion and to create less at times of economic contraction, 
leading to business fluctuations. It can be compared with the harvest 
cycle in ancient farming societies. Within these societies the lenders 
gave excessive amounts of loans in prosperous years thus raising the 
general levels of debt. Although in harsh years they constricted the 
amounts. This repeatedly led to systemic borrower defaults and loss of 
collateral, resulting in a concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
lenders. In other words, banks lend a lot when the economy is 
expanding, but this expansion will sooner or later halt and when it does, 
banks will lend less. This increases the levels of economic volatility and 
will be even bigger when the money is privately issued, which Benes et 
al. (2012) also debates. Huge Business fluctuation causes deeper 
recessions and recessions cause unemployment. Deep recessions are 
costly for the government, because unemployment equals loss in tax 
revenue and increased spending in unemployment benefits etc. 
according to Dyson (2014).   
History is full of examples where privately issued money has caused 
problems with high inflation. While money issued by the government 
have caused high inflation at some rare occasions, association 
between inflation and specific actions of government money issuing 
have been questioned in recent times. According to Benes et al. (2012) 
correlation between the two is a common misconception. When 
government funding is available, banks can borrow any amount of 
required reserves from the government. By having full government 
funding of credit, this will give the government the opportunity to 
reduce tax distortions, which stimulates the economy. 
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XI. About Narrow banking 
One of the characteristics of a narrow bank is safe banking without the 
necessity of 100% cash reserves. As stated by Cochrane (2014), a 
Pigouvian Tax on run-prone short-term debt would lessen risk-taking 
behavior for financial institutions. For example, say that the bank (or an 
other intermediary) needs to pay a 5% tax for every run-prone short-
term dollar of debt issued (the same methods that are applied for 
polluting industries, it would only make sense for an equal application 
on financial pollution). The main problem lies within run-prone 
contracts, which suggests towards the regulation of such. A Pigouvian 
tax rather than a subsidy (which for instance is present in the form of 
tax deductibility for debt). This form of tax could then be used as an 
instrument for cyclical policies by the government. The Pigouvian tax 
would be the price of run-prone contracts and it would be up to the 
individual intermediary to decide if it is a worthy sacrifice.  
Furthermore, the bank should keep equity in proportion to (although 
the more the better) their debt; the equity could be made up by e.g. 
issued stocks. By lowering the debt/equity ratio the risk of the operation 
is equally dropped. The increased costs for the banks might be 
reflected by higher prices for their services but free-market conditions 
would eventually push these fees down in an orderly fashion to a level 
of equilibrium.  
However, there are different proposals of narrow banking. By definition 
a narrow bank is a safe bank that is immune to runs. One proposal 
suggests that demand deposit and lending should not be combined 
and should not be undertaken by a single institution. Demand deposit 
would be a service that a financial institute could offer by the charge 
of a fee.  
A different financial institute would offer lending and specialize in that. 
The proposal by Pierce (1991) suggests that narrow banks can only 
invest in short-term safe assets such as treasury bills and not long-term 
safe assets. The main reason being that banks can suffer from liquidity 
shortage due to costly liquidation of the long-term assets. However, this 
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is rather rare and can only occur if all depositors want to withdraw all 
of their savings at the same time. 
To mitigate this risk, investment should consist only of short-term safe 
assets. While being inefficient compared to an institution with lending 
and demand deposit accounts, it will eliminate the problem of moral 
hazard. It is shown however (both empirically and theoretically) that a 
single institution with both a lending function and a demand deposit 
function is far more efficient due to synergy-effects (Kobayakawa et al 
2000). 
 In this case we only consider the liquidity risk and not the credit risk 
(although, the credit risk can be lowered by implementing restrictions 
and giving banks the incentives to work harder in the screening 
process, thus not giving bad loans that will surely default). 
In accordance to the statements above, our main focus will be on an 
institution that handles both lending and demand deposit accounts. 
The main issue by not separating the two, it is that we still have the 
problem of moral hazard. Consequently we need to find another way 
to mitigate that problem. A way that does not include the separation 
of the functions of lending and the issuance of demand deposits (due 
to the loss of efficiency) 
XII. The Proposal By The Positive Money Organization 
The sovereign money system is a system proposed by Dyson and 
several other economists from the Positive Money Organization. The 
starting point will be to take away the money-creation power from the 
banks and transfer this power to the central bank; The amounts that will 
be created will be decided by a committee (something similar to 
Monetary Policy Committee) who will think about the economy as a 
whole and create the “right” amount of money to run the economy 
smoothly and meet the inflation targets (not to create the amount that 
is needed by banks, politicians or the government). This committee 
needs to be uninfluenced by strong groups in the society to maintain 
an unbiased role. In short, the decision on how much money that will 
be created and how this money is going to be set into circulation must 
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be separated to avoid a conflict of interest. The money that will be 
created will be non-repayable debt free money that can be spent 
freely within the economy. The Monetary Policy committee will not set 
the interest rates anymore; instead the market will set the interest rates. 
How should this money be spent into the system? In general there are 
four different ways to stimulate the economy. By reducing the overall 
tax burden or direct payment to the citizens, people will be able to 
spend more money. People will have more money and this might be 
used to repay debts and loans. In the long run, it is important to lower 
the national and private debt levels. Tax reductions on businesses can 
lead to increased levels of employment. The money can be spent into 
the system by the government, whom may start major projects, 
resulting in job opportunities. It is important to reduce high levels of 
government debt. The money gained can be spent to partially reduce 
the national debt (Dyson et al 2014). 
The main reason why banks should not be able to create money in the 
first place is that they behave pro cyclically to gain more profit, 
meaning that banks overheat the economy in economic expansion 
and over cool the economy in economic contraction. This contributes 
to instability of prices in general and of interest rates in particular 
(Huber and Robertson 2000). As mentioned earlier in this paper, which 
is also argued by the Chicago plan, banks would not likely suffer cash-
flow shortage in the same extent as in today’s system, implicitly 
reducing the systemic risk levels. With less boom-and-busts cycles, 
recessions would be less frequent, leading to lower levels of 
unemployment. Less people would have financial difficulties and more 
would be able to repay their loans as planned, leading to a lower 
default rate. Banks will have limited funds for making loans. Instead of 
lending as much as possible (as in today’s system) banks would instead 
need to find good quality borrowers to lend to. 
Dyson et al (2014) argues that in the current system too much lending is 
projected towards the house market and the financial sector, leading 
to massive inflation in the house market as well as extreme fluctuations 
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in the financial market. It is argued that this is a major problem and a 
partial cause to the recent financial crisis.   
a. Banking Under The Proposal By The Positive Money Organization 
According to the proposal the new banks will need to split deposits into 
two different accounts. These two accounts will be transaction 
accounts and investment accounts (currently savings account). It is 
only the transaction account that will be fully backed and thus being 
safe towards runs. Money in transaction accounts would not be a part 
of banks liabilities; in other words, it will be excluded from the banks’ 
balance sheets. The money will be held in an account at the central 
bank. Meaning that if a particular bank fails no money will be lost; 
instead this money will be transferred and administered by a different 
bank. 
In this system the deposit guarantee will not cost taxpayers any money 
and the money cannot be lost in the first place. The amount that is 
guaranteed in this system has no upper bound, compared to 250 
thousand dollars in today’s USA, 85 thousand pounds in the UK or 100 
thousand Euros in within the EU. Deposit insurance in the current 
banking system is extremely costly for the taxpayers if a run occurs. Thus 
money in the investment accounts would not be insured and will be 
classified as an investment, which per se is risky. The customer should 
be aware of the risk and the exclusion of deposit insurance since 
money in investment accounts is not classified as deposits. 
Transaction accounts will be used for day-to-day transactions, such as 
paying ones rent or buying groceries, while the investment accounts 
will be the primary tool for the banks under this system to fund their 
investments (which is lending activities). 
There will be no interest rate on transaction accounts, as in today’s 
system. The question is; is the loss that big? People that have money in 
demand deposit accounts in banks today do not use it mainly to gain 
interest on the money, but instead use it as a means of payment (de 
facto the deposits interest today is only figurative). People invest in 
funds, indices or stocks to prevent suffrage from inflation, not by having 
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idle money stored at the bank. The banks under the FRBS will not be 
able to use the money in the transaction accounts to finance their 
loans, which means that they need to charge an extra fee when 
providing this service to the customers. This fee will probably be 
lowered as time passes due to market competition. The quality of the 
service will improve, as for the system renewal. All transaction accounts 
will be directly linked to one another ensuing enhanced transaction 
speed. The main reason for this is that there will be no “clearing 
system”. Without it, the banks can run the new system much cheaper; 
hence the banks do not have to demand high fees to the customers. 
In the current system it might take some time to do the transactions, 
(maybe hours or even up to days in extreme cases) but with the new 
system the transactions can possibly be made instantly, resulting in a 
more efficient economy. Both individuals and companies will benefit 
greatly from this. 
The investment accounts will resemble an index fund portfolio, 
meaning the investment account would no longer be safe and 
backed by reserves. This form of saving will be risky but much less riskier 
compared to other form of savings. And as long as the bank is doing a 
good job, this form of saving will be considered risk-free. Investment 
accounts will function in line with today’s general belief, as a pure 
intermediary. These investment accounts can have different levels of 
risk, yielding returns in accordance to the investors’ risk-preference.  
The risk can be transferred to the bank, but not entirely. As an example, 
the bank could offer a minimum percentage of the original investment 
(when failing to profit from the investment) and by this giving a return in 
relation to the level of risk. This will lower the risk for the investor but will 
also lower the return. So possibly there will be different plans, 
considering risk-reward and how long time the investor can be without 
the money. This means that the risk will not fall on a third party, which in 
today’s case is the taxpayers. This system will encourage banks to act 
more cautious when investing and more likely not to fail because of 
the higher incentive to succeed. These investment accounts are still 
prone to runs, as investors can withdraw the money when the 
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investment period is over. A run is plausible but rather unlikely because 
the economy as a whole is more stable after the reform. 
In cases when banks do not have enough money to pay back 
maturing investment accounts, the Central bank will make an 
emergency loan to that bank, only if the bank have a short-term 
liquidity problems. The bank will repay the loan to the central bank 
using future income. However it is important to distinguish between 
bad banks and profiting banks with temporary cash-flow problems and 
accordingly only offering help to prudent banks. The process will 
transpire in similarity to the current system, money creation when 
lending followed by money destruction when repaying the debt. 
The current banking system has a flaw where banks will seek more 
profit while taking on more risk although the banks do not pay the 
monetary cost in occurrence of a failure. Instead the cost eventually 
falls on the taxpayers via the government. This creates the problem of 
moral hazard. In accordance to Dyson et al (2014) this means that the 
bank will benefit when the investment is successful but if the bank is 
unsuccessful, taxpayers will only lose and has nothing to gain. This 
problem will be nonexistent, due to no bailouts and no deposit 
insurance.  
 Deposit insurance has affected banks behavior towards risk. Banks 
take on more risk because they know that the government will pay out 
deposit insurance to the owners of the deposits in the event of a failure.  
According to Dell ´Ariccia et al (2012) bailouts of banks has a positive 
effect towards banks risk taking, lowering the moral hazard effect with 
a substantial amount. When a bank’s success depends on the 
idiosyncratic risk and the overall stability of the banking system, 
shielding banks from systemic risk and the risk of contagion might give 
banks the incentive to invest prudently. Considering that the new 
system in this proposal will be more stable, the effect caused by moral 
hazard might outweigh the positive effects of bailouts. As mentioned 
before bailouts are also expensive for the society. The contagious 
nature in this case is when a run on institution A can cause a run on 
institution B solely because of the fact that the investors will now also 
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be questioning the finances of institution B. A sudden shock triggers to 
a second mechanism of contagion. Suppose that Bank B is holding a 
lot of Bank A securities. When those securities become illiquid, Bank B 
cannot count on selling those securities to raise cash to pay creditors in 
case of a run. Therefore bank A’s problems can cause a run on bank B. 
XIII. Joint-Liability Arrangement 
Sanches (2013) presents the idea of a system with shared liabilities 
among banks, overseen by a clearinghouse. The idea of building a 
common supervisory system is also supported by Werner Sinn (2010), 
where he talks about stretching this notion further and create an 
international super-ordinate regulatory organ. The banking-world 
would then work under a hierarchy where e.g. a central bank would 
be a subordinate supervisory agency to work on national level.  
The joint-liability arrangement sprung from the questioning of the 
inefficiency of having high levels of reserves. The reserves are inefficient 
in the sense that they may not be invested in interest bearing assets. If 
the banks within an economy would agree to form a bank coalition (a 
joint-liability arrangement) were they would ensure the solvency of 
each individual bank.  
 As opposed to markets, this bank coalition involves the monitoring and 
supervision of the activities of member banks; A resemblance to the 
clearinghouse associations that developed in the U.S. during the 19th 
century (Sanches 2013). The system would further warrant the 
transferring of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks to ensure 
solvency when the interbank markets fails. The assembly of this kind of 
coalition would further benefit the banks because of the risk-sharing 
possibilities. The joint-liability arrangement would induce societal 
benefits by a more effective way of allocating resources, achieved by 
the introduction of an incentive-feasible scheme among members of 
the banking-sector (Sanches 2013).  
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a. The Model of Joint-Liability6 
As developed by Sanches (2013) the parameters setup and scenario is 
as follows: 
The agents of the economy meet in a centralized place and are 
randomly matched into pairs. The trade is based on bank liabilities that 
might be redeemed to claim their face value. Buyers buy their goods 
from sellers using bank notes and the key problem is the incentives of 
hidden actions from the bankers. The system of joint-liability is 
presented to induce bankers to voluntarily report the amount of bank 
notes (liabilities) issued to the clearinghouse and also hold the suitable 
amount of reserves. The clearinghouse would be a safekeeping and 
recordkeeping institution. It would also supervise and monitor 
transactions and settlement/clearing of the liabilities at each period. 
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. Each period is divided into 
three subperiods or stages. There are two physical commodities, 
referred to as good x and good y that are perfectly divisible. There are 
three types of agents, indexed by 1, 2, 3, who are infinitely lived. There 
is a [0, 1] continuum of each type. 
Types 2 and 3 wants to consume good x, whereas type 1 wants to 
consume good y. Good x needs to be stored properly in the subperiod 
in which it is produced or it will depreciate completely. Good y must be 
consumed in the subperiod in which it is produced or it will perish. Type 
1 is able to produce good x only in the first subperiod. Type 2 is able to 
produce good y only in the second subperiod. Type 3 is unable to 
produce either good but has access to the technology to perfectly 
store good x at any moment. In the first subperiod each type 3 also has 
access to a divisible investment technology that requires good x as an 
input and yields a fixed return (in terms of good x) only at the beginning 
of the following date. Finally, each type 3 has access to a technology 
that allows her to create, at zero cost, an indivisible and durable 
object, referred to as a bank note, which perfectly identifies her. This 
means that notes issued by each type 3 are perfectly distinguishable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  models	  are	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  section	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  work	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from those issued by other people so that counterfeiting will not be a 
problem.  
We assume the production technology of good x allows type 1 to 
produce either zero or one unit of good x at each date, even though 
good x is perfectly divisible. 
Type 2 may produce of good y and consume good x.  
In the first subperiod, each type 1 is randomly matched with a type 2 
with probability 𝜆  𝜖  (0,1) (where 𝜖  denotes an arbitrarily small positive 
number). In the third subperiod, all type 2 and all type 3 meet in a 
centralized location. Make the assumption that, after meeting with a 
type 1 bilaterally in the first subperiod, all type 3 immediately moves to 
the centralized location only in the third subperiod. 
b. Exchange Mechanism7 
A convenient description of the process of exchange would be to refer 
to type 1 as a buyer, to type 2 as a seller and to type 3 as a banker.  
In the first stage, each buyer will be randomly matched with a banker 
and will be able to receive a bank note by trading their produced 
good x.   
In the second stage, a random match will occur between the buyer 
and the seller with the probability 𝜆. The buyer requests good y but is 
unable to produce good x at that time, hence a trade will only be 
made possible in the presence of an intermediary service. This service 
will become available through personal liabilities, redeemable on 
demand, offered by the bankers, type 3 (bank notes).  Accordingly, 
the objects traded between the buyer and seller is good y and bank 
notes.  
In the third and final stage all sellers and bankers interact in a 
centralized location. Here every trader may convert any privately 
issued liability into good x (that he would have acquired in the previous 
stage). The third stage may be called the settlement stage.  
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Figure 1.4 Sequence of Events within a Period (Sanches, 2013) 
 
No production takes place in this stage and the objects traded are 
good x and bank notes, se Figure 1.4 as a reference to the sequence. 
The arrangement works as long as each banker is willing to set aside 
(i.e. invest in the storage technology) the appropriate amount of good 
x to have enough reserves to honour any note put up for redemption in 
the final stage. The arrangements are aggravated by the fact that 
they are not all perfectly observable. 
The information structure of this economy is as follows. Each banker 
may observe the actions of any other banker within the centralized 
location. All bilateral trades within the first and second stage are 
private (only the participating agents have information about their 
trade). By this assumption the information regarding the creation of 
bank notes is also private. Each individual banker may then have her 
own incentives regarding the issuance of private liabilities without 
securing them with the storage technology (the only available safe, 
short-term asset).  
An important thing to take into consideration is that each banker may 
want to opportunistically access previously accumulated reserves. This 
means that the possibility of a banker having many unresolved notes 
because of a history of successful trading and only a few redemptions 
creates a problem. This is particularly true for a banker who has held 
reserves as to secure issued notes that remain in circulation (whereas 
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the buyer have not had the opportunity to trade with a seller). If these 
reserves become very large the incentives may increase to 
opportunistically consume them, thus defaulting on the initial promise.  
The establishing of a clearinghouse association in time t=0 may 
mitigate the difficulties mentioned above. Its role would be that of a 
safekeeping and recordkeeping institution. Any banker may be a 
member of the association, at no cost, with the condition to follow its 
rules. The clearinghouse demands that all issuances of bank notes in 
the first stage are to be reported. The bankers are required to store a 
fraction of the face value of each bank note they issue within the 
clearinghouse as a reserve. 
 
As earlier mentioned, the bankers would head to the centralized 
location directly after the meetings with the buyers in the first period. 
There they will make any reports to the clearinghouse and make any 
required deposits. The bankers may also make investments in the 
productive technology.  
Any failure to comply with the rules of the association will lead to an 
immediate and permanent exclusion. The divergence from the rules 
will however not be confirmed until an unreported bank note is 
presented at a future settlement stage. An important note is that the 
seller will base its decision regarding the exchange of a bank note for 
his good y on current available information on the banker.  
The theoretical framework mentioned above (developed by Sanches, 
2013) will provide each seller with information from the clearinghouse. 
The membership of the clearinghouse association will act as a 
confirmation of security and assure compliance to the rules.  
This certification will make the members more attractive to the sellers 
when it comes to trade in the final stage since all clearinghouse 
information is public. 
 To conclude the exchange mechanisms a final assumption is made. 
The allowed number of held notes of an agent at any one moment is 
restricted to 0,1  (for further references, please read Sanches, 2013, 
pp.11 §2nd). There are no restrictions on the number of notes that an 
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individual banker is allowed to issue at any moment except for that 
imposed by the matching technology and the other agents’ willingness 
to trade. Thus, they may issue bank notes in accordance to 0,1,2… . 
Figure 1.5 illustrates the cycle of bank notes.  
 A further assumption (for the interested reader, it is formally derived in 
Sanches, 2013) is that a truthful reporting of every individual bankers 
note issuance gives a profitable discounted utility. It is further argued 
that untruthful reporting gives a disadvantage that is increasing over 
time. The probability for the banker to stay undetected in her deviation 
from reporting will be with the probability of (1-𝜆)n; where n denotes the 
current number of period since the issuance of the unreported note. n 
will be equal to 1 in the first period, 2 in the second period and so on.  
 
 
Figure 1.5 Creation and Redemption of Bank Notes (Sanches, 2013) 
 
c. Joint-Liability Arrangement Under FRBS 
 
Suppose that the bankers initially agree to the terms of the 
clearinghouse. All bank note issuance will be in the form of effectively 
joint obligations between the members. The individual bankers will sign 
as a debtor towards her own bank notes although in the event of a 
default the clearinghouse will assure that the other members will 
honour their obligations as creditors. This message is publicly 
announced. Thus, this mutual understanding entitles any individual 
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banker to use the other bankers’ reserves in the case of redemption 
but also requires her to offer the same in return if tables are turned. 
The clearinghouse will invest some of the amounts given as reserves 
into the productive technology. The specific volumes are judged by 
the clearinghouse and will then form the portfolio of the association. 
The reserve amounts given by each individual banker is equal to the 
amount that satisfies a specified utility-constraint. Thereby the solvency 
of the individual banks that is called for redemption is given by the ratio 
of the total amount of reserves at the clearinghouse to the total value 
of all notes that are put up for redemption at that time. The system 
builds on the notion that not all notes will be redeemed at the same 
time and that profit is to be made by the investment of fractions of the 
reserves in interest bearing assets. The multiparty arrangement offers a 
total of higher rate of return for its members when all members 
contribute.  
This joint-liability arrangement initiates a mechanism for pooling 
reserves as a security for insolvency and also increases the number of 
interest-bearing assets within the coalition (and reducing the number 
of non-interest-bearing assets) thus obtaining a situation of pareto-
efficient dominance which also grants welfare-gains by the improved 
allocation of resources.  
XIV. Conclusion 
We have concluded that an actor of financial intermediation is 
beneficial for development reasons as well as a helpful tool that is 
desired by investors of different preferences and make up for inevitable 
market imperfections.  
 The banking system embraces the whole world and by that, 
regulations are required. It is almost as the banking and monetary 
systems are seen as natural parts of the planet, at least to today’s 
modern societies. A big blunder was once again realized when the 
lack of regulations of the bank-like entities sparked the latest global 
financial shock a couple of years back and the fragility of the system 
was exposed. This only further stresses the fact that the current system 
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needs to be revised. The proposals cited and presented in this paper 
are good starts on viable systems that could lessen the power-
concentration experienced today and would also offer longer-term 
stability. Calculations and estimates of the time and costs for 
implementations are beyond the coverage of this paper although the 
importance lies within the rising of the discussion. We see it as important 
to broaden the framework regarding the definition of banks to cover-
up loopholes that may be exploited by dubious actors such as the 
ones that sprouted the highly leveraged bad financing that trended in 
[especially] the USA before 2007.  
 Through our studies we have realized that the 100% cash reserves 
against demand deposits does not seem like a practical solution. The 
economical costs for implementation as well as the loss of efficiency 
are too great. However, we do think that a reform into a form of 
narrow banking is possible and would be beneficial for society.  
 The Pigouvian Tax ought to be instated and regulations would harvest 
better results if they focused on equity demands. Both these measures 
would lessen the run-prone exposure of banks.  
As mentioned in the proposal made by The Positive Money 
Organization the society would benefit if the trade-off between stability 
and efficiency would over-weight towards the former.  
The allocation-efficiency of capital will be somewhat lower than in the 
current system although the hypothetical transaction accounts would 
be run-proof, thus offering a higher grade of stability. In addition to this, 
transactions will run more smoothly where money will be transferred 
almost instantly and accordingly the receiving part of a transaction will 
be able to utilize the acquired funds immediately. 
It is understood that a radical alteration of the entire system would be 
both costly and time consuming and with that in mind, the answer to 
the question about which of the systems presented that is henceforth 
recommended would land on a modified version of the current system.  
The joint-liability arrangement offers sound ideas for stabilization as well 
as welfare gains through higher rate of return on held capital. The 
implementation of a supervisory organ formed through a coalition of 
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the banks seems like a highly viable and desired option and the short 
presentation made by Werner Sinn (2010) is a good start. The work-
ways of this arrangement should then follow in the manner of Sanches 
(2013) ideas. Regulations need to be redefined. The lending function of 
banks is a great lubricant for development however, by the enacting 
of policies, societal risk might be decreased. Among the 
advantageous points of the fractional reserve banking system is the 
fact that it speeds the issuance of loans by the maturity transformation 
of asset and liabilities. The ideas presented by Lucas Stokey (2011) are 
great compliments to the Joint-Liability Arrangement. It is also the most 
reasonable proposal to approve within the short-term (as well as the 
Pigouvian tax on run-prone, short-term debt). The six points stated 
above should be legislated immediately. The sores of the crisis are still 
fresh and it is never to soon to start building preventative measures.  
An insinuation towards caution regarding the fractional reserve 
banking system is advisable in the absence of the complete reform of 
the system. Until then one can only take appraisal in what has 
transpired and try to cover for eventual weaknesses in the future. 
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XV. Food For Thought: Responsibility 
 
Admati and Hellwig (2013) makes a valid point by making head to 
head comparison between banks and companies working in the 
industrial sector. On the latter, huge demands and regulations are put 
by the government on the way they operate. An industrial plant 
cannot freely pollute the environment. Demands on the level of 
cleansing for the companies waste material are governed. This might 
result in expensive (economically) changes in the manufacturing 
process for the individual company compared to the effects on the 
environment and further impacts the sums may be quite small in the 
long run. The company will probably raise the cost of their product and 
in the end it might even result in a zero-sum scenario.  
A common argument for not putting equal regulations on the 
practices of banks is that it would be too expensive. A reasonable 
question to follow would be:  -­‐ “Expensive for whom?”  
The activities of the bank would probably be slowed down which 
would result in the loss of income and also (as an example) a more in-
depth screening process (in order to lessen the level of risk) would 
entail further expenses. But these costs would probably be a great deal 
less than the costs and losses followed by a global financial crisis.  
“ The point of public intervention is precisely to induce banks, or 
industries, to take account of costs they impose on others ”(Admati 
and Hellwig 2013) 
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